Abstract : This paper analyses the control of Belgian listed companies. The analysis reveals that control of listed companies in Belgium is highly concentrated. Business groups, holding companies, and voting pacts, play an important role in bringing about this concentration. The main characteristics of the Belgian corporate ownership and equity market can be summarised as follows : (i) few -merely 140 -Belgian companies are listed on the Brussels stock exchange, (ii) there is a high degree of ownership concentration with an average largest direct shareholding of 45%, (iii) holding companies and families, and to a lesser extent industrial companies, are the main investor categories whose share stakes are concentrated into powerful control blocks through business group structures and voting pacts, (iv) control is levered by pyramidal and complex ownership structures and (v) there is a market for share stakes.
Introduction
Different degrees of ownership concentration reflect the trade off between, on the one hand, the diversification advantage of investing in many assets and, on the other hand, the (private) benefits of controlling a firm. As Franks and Mayer (1995) point out, it is puzzling that the resolution of this trade off has taken such a variety of forms in different countries. They classify the ownership structures into two categories: insider and outsider systems. The equity markets of this first system are characterised by few listed companies, an illiquid capital market where ownership and control is infrequently traded and complex systems of intercorporate holdings. Consequently, these structures are appropriately described as insider or entreprise-oriented systems as it is the corporate sector or families and individuals who hold controlling interests and outsider investors, while able to participate in equity returns through the stock market, are not able to exert much control.
Continental Europe and Japan fit into this broad classification. In contrast, the Anglo-American system is a market oriented or outsider system and is characterised by a large number of listed companies, a liquid capital market where ownership and control rights are frequently traded and few intercorporate holdings. 1 There are few large, controlling shareholdings and these are rarely associated with the corporate sector itself. Diversified shareholdings are useful from the point of view of risk reduction but discourage active participation of investors.
The main characteristics of the Belgian corporate ownership and equity market can be summarized as follows : (i) few -merely 140 -Belgian companies are listed on the Brussels stock exchange, (ii) there is a high degree of ownership concentration with an average largest direct shareholding of 45%, (iii) holding companies and families, and to a lesser extent industrial companies, are the main investor categories whose share stakes are concentrated into powerful control blocks through business group structures and voting pacts, (iv) control is levered by pyramidal and complex ownership structures and (v) there is a market for share stakes. Properties (i) to (iv) imply that Belgium can be portrayed as a prototype of the 'insider system'. However, typical for Belgium is the importance of cascades of holding companies which are used to lever control. 2 Consequently, an ultimate investor can control a target company while holding relatively few cash flow rights. 
Corporate landscape : the prevalence of the limited partnership (SPRL) and the stock corporation (SA).
Belgium counts approximately 220,000 firm, most of which are small with half of them counting less than five employees or less than BF 10 million of total assets. Two legal forms dominate: the Société Privée à Responsabilité Limitée or the Besloten Vennootschap met Beperkte Aansprakelijkheid (SPRL or BVBA, a limited liability partnership) and the Société Anonyme or Naamloze Vennootschap (SA or NV, a stock corporation). There are about 90,000 companies of each type 3 . Tables 1a, 1b and 1c present an overview of the legal corporate forms, their capital requirements, number of companies, equity transfer procedures and accounting information disclosure rules.
[
insert Tables 1a, b, c about here]
SPRLs are the most numerous among small firms (99% of SPRLs are firms with less than BEF 100 millions of total assets). Their ownership certificates are nominative and the transferability of the certificates is subject to restrictions, for example the agreement of the other partners. Most large firms are SAs (84% of firms over 100 millions of total assets are SAs). Their distinguishing feature is the possibility of issuing bearer shares with no restriction on their transferability.
There are currently approximately 140 Belgian registered firms that are listed on the official market of the Brussels Stock Exchange. They are of various sizes and belong to all sectors of the economy. Holding companies account for 23% of the market capitalisation, while electricity and gas companies represent 20% of the capitalisation on the Brussels Stock Exchange. Other sectors with a high market capitalisation are banks and financial services companies (14%), chemical companies (9%) and insurance companies (8%). Market capitalisation is highly concentrated among a few large firms: the Top 10 account for 50% of the total market capitalisation, while the Top 50 represent 95% of the market capitalisation. Turnover is low for smaller listed firms: the BEL20 market index, which includes 20 firms, accounts for 83% of the total market turnover. instance, a company that has revealed that it owns a stake of 11 percent will have to notify the Banking Commission 9 again once this ownership stake reaches 15 percent or more, or decreases below the 10%-threshold.
Real and potential voting rights
The notification percentages refer to real and potential voting rights. As a result, ownership of securities convertible into shares (convertible bonds, warrants, etc) is treated similarly in terms of disclosure as vote bearing shares in the company. 10 So, when investors make voting rights declarations, they include: (i) the percentage of the actual total voting rights they own, proportional to all the actual voting rights outstanding, (ii) the potential voting rights, as a percentage to the aggregate of all potential voting rights and (iii) the percentage of cumulative actual and potential 'reference shareholder' is affiliated to or acts in concert with. 14 In the case of voting pacts, the same rules as for business groups apply.
In addition, once the stake of an investor (or of the investors belonging to the same investor group) reaches 20 percent of the voting rights of the company or falls bellow this threshold, the strategic policy with regard to the target has to be declared to the Banking Commission and the target.
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Notification Process.
The investor who purchases or sells shares (the voting rights) or potential voting rights has to disclose his control position and the changes herein to the target company and to the Commission for Banking and Finance in Brussels at the latest on the second working day after the transaction, if a notification threshold has been transgressed. Standardised sheets guarantee homogeneity in the declarations. Apart from the number and percentage of real and potential voting rights, a notification sheet reveals the identity of the investor, the investor's business group (if appropriate), voting pacts, policy statements (20% rule) and the date referring to the change in voting rights.
6
The target company who has been notified about changes in ownership by substantial investors, has a maximum of one working day after disclosure to pass on this information to the An investor's failure to disclose a substantial shareholding may lead to an interdiction to the investor in question to participate to the annual meeting, to a cancellation of the annual meeting which has been called for, to a suspension of the exercise of all or part of the rights pertaining to the securities for a certain period and even to liability to penalties 18 . 19 The voting rights of recently acquired major shareholdings (5% and more) can only be exercised 45 days after notification.
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Ownership disclosure of non-listed companies
The EC Directive and the subsequent national legislation only refer to transparency of listed companies. Still, Belgian law also requires every corporate shareholder of a non-listed Société Anonyme (NV) registered in Belgium, to notify this company as soon as this shareholder holds more than 10% of the total votes of one category of shares. When the notification decreases to less than 10%, a similar notification has to take place. However, in practice, this rule is not strictly respected (Becht, 1997) . There is still an indirect way of gathering partial information on shareholdings in nonlisted public firms. All SAs (NVs), both listed and non-listed, are obliged to publish in their annual report, the content of their shareholding portfolios in other firms, be it Belgian or foreign.
The shares of private firms (like the SPRL or BVBA) are always nominative and the owners are registered in a register of partners. To the public, the ownership structure is not accessible; only the partners, fiscal authorities and third parties having an interest in the firm, like debtors or creditors, can consult the register. 
Voting rights dilution and restrictions, and the rights of the minority shareholders.
In principle, the general assembly takes decisions based on a simple majority of the voting rights. Since 1991, the balance of corporate power has shifted to the controlling shareholders whom have been given legal instruments to entrench their position in the company and to protect themselves against undesired takeovers. Anti-takeover instruments, like share repurchase schemes or issuance of warrants, can be installed by the board of directors at any moment in time if the shareholders have given authorisation to the board. Such an authorisation remains valid for a maximum of 5 years but can be reinstated for a similar period (Wymeersch 1994a As disclosure is only obligatory for shareholdings exceeding 5% (or 3% if the company so chooses) our ownership data are truncated. Still, we were able to collect many shareholdings of less than 5% because, when an investor with a small shareholding belongs to an investor group or is involved in a voting pact, his share stake will be disclosed as well. Furthermore, the potential voting rights, referring to warrants and convertibles are to be disclosed such that, along with these potential voting rights, small stakes or real voting rights are also disclosed. For five companies, the stock exchange did not receive any ownership notifications. These companies were not included in our 1995 database 31 .
Direct shareholdings, Group blocks and Voting blocks.
The Belgian transparency legislation requires investors not to disclose cash flow rights, but deals with voting rights. Still, the discrepancy between direct share stakes and voting rights is rather small as the principle of one-share-one-vote is usually upheld within one ownership tier. Direct share stakes are shareholdings on the first ownership tier and belong to an single shareholder. Some of these direct share stakes belong to group blocks as they are controlled by an ultimate shareholder who may use a pyramid of intermediate companies to control several direct shareholdings. Finally, there are also voting coalitions between shareholders or group blocks, which we call voting blocks.
Of the 140 companies listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange, for 135 companies there was at least one ownership notification in 1995. Overall, there are 269 notified voting blocks, 431 group blocks and 551 direct shareholdings. Table 2 shows that the average listed firm has 5 direct shareholders, 3 group blocks and two voting blocks. Eighty percent of the voting blocks count 2 to 5 shareholders.
In three quarters of the cases a group block corresponds to a voting block.
[Insert The histogram of the largest direct share stakes of Figure 2 exhibits peaks at the 25% and the 50% thresholds, indicating the importance of blocking minorities and majority control respectively.
There are relatively few direct voting blocks in the range 35-50%. In Belgium, the mandatory bid rule requires shareholder who accumulate a shareholding which leads to a change in control at a price higher than the market to make a tender offer for the other outstanding shares. In practice, it is the court that can decide whether a control change has taken place or not. If a stake of about one third of the voting rights is acquired, in most cases this is regarded as a control change. Therefore, either companies deliberately remain underneath the 33.3% threshold or acquire more than 50% of the voting rights. The mandatory bid threshold might also explain why there are relatively many share stakes of more than 66.66% of the voting rights [Insert figure 2 about here]
On average, the sum of the direct share stakes held by large shareholders (who own at least 5% of the outstanding shares) amounts to more than 65% in 1994 (Table 4) . Cumulative direct ownership is higher, almost 70% in the financial sector, and around 65% for both holding companies, and the industrial and commercial companies. It is clear that the concentrated ownership structure does not facilitate hostile takeovers if the acquirer does not initially have a large toehold. Panel A of 
Voting blocks 33
The largest voting blocks in listed companies control, on average, 56% of the voting rights, giving them absolute majority control ( Figure 3 ). The second and third largest voting blocks are much smaller with combined share stakes of respectively 6.6 and 4.5%. The histogram (Figure 4) with the largest direct share stakes which are controlled by a voting block shows peaks at the 50-60% level and the 65-70% level reflecting the absolute majority threshold and the qualified majority level (2/3 of the votes) which is required for certain decisions at the annual meeting. In only 17% of the listed companies, a voting block owns a supermajority (75% or more), a voting rights threshold allowing the voting blockholder to change the acts of incorporation, including voting rights (see also Figure 5 ). 34 Table 5 details the most important blockholders by name and Table 6 by type. For example, the Generale Maatschappij/Société Générale controlled by the French holding SuezLyonaise des Eaux, is present as a voting block holder in 16 listed companies and controls an average voting rights package of over 50% (Table 5 ).
insert Figures 3, 4 and 5 about here]
[insert Tables 5 and 6 about here]
The evolution of ownership in concentrated companies with a shareholding of at least 25% 35 since 1989 is given in Table 7 . Ownership concentration of the largest direct shareholding has increased slightly over a 6 year period since the transparency legislation. Considering only those companies with a largest shareholding of more than 25%, the average largest direct shareholding has increased from 55% to about 58%. Ultimate levered control is defined as the product of the intermediate shareholdings between the sample company and the ultimate controlling shareholder.
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The average levered shareholding's increase from 38% to almost 42% is largely due to a shortening of the ownership pyramids. All in all, from 1989 to 1994, there have been no substantial changes in the aggregate concentration of ownership in Belgian listed companies. Renneboog (1999) shows that there is an active market in controlling share stakes in Belgium, but given the value of control as reflected in the control premium, share blocks do not tend to get dispersed.
[insert Table 7 about here] Holding companies.
Categories of Shareholders
The analysis on the basis of voting blocks reveals that, although holding companies remain the most important shareholder class in Belgian listed companies, their average cumulative shareholding on an ultimate control basis decreases to 26.7% from an average direct shareholding of 32.7 (panel A, Table 4 ). The differences are explained by the fact that family controlled holding by a bank might influence that bank's decision with regard to ceasing additional credit.
-Since most banks are controlled by a holding company which might be a substantial shareholder in a company, it is doubtful whether banks would be able to make independent decisions with regard to a shareholding in that company or granted loans.
-Most investment and pension funds are managed by a bank which ensures the distribution of the investment fund's certificates (shares). Legally, investment and pension funds' management should use the voting rights associated with the shares of a company they have invested in, independent of the managing bank.
The Government
In principle, the federal state does not invest in listed Belgian companies. But it owns 50% of the shares of the National Bank, of which the shares are listed in the Brussels Stock Exchange, and 50% of the 'public credit institutions'. The role of the public credit institutions has been broadened to that of a bank and these banks have been privatised. The 'public investment companies', owned by the regional governments hold blocks in shares of a few listed companies. 
Foreign shareholder classes
The relative importance of domestic and foreign investors is examined in the last two columns of Of the foreign investors, it is primarily the holding companies that hold large share stakes and control with a majority stake in 15% of all the Belgian listed companies. This paper has also reported recent changes in legislation which have made existing shareholder even more powerful in warding off take over threats. Still, Belgian shareholders do not pay a high price for control as ownership cascades violate the one-share-one-vote rule. The cash flow rights, which reflect the actual equity stake, owned by an ultimate shareholder are often substantially lower than his control rights. The Commission for Banking and Finance, usually abbreviated to Banking Commission, is the Belgian equivalent of the S.E.C. in the U.S. In a strict legal sense, the authority of the Banking Commission in the area of ownership disclosure supervision and M&A activity is limited, but the Commission has considerable influence on market participants on the basis of its 'moral authority'. 10 Law of 2 March 1989, Section 1, paragraph 3. Note that this article was initially interpreted as referring to all potential voting rights regardless whether these voting rights were linked to existing securities (as in the case with common stock options) or securities that would be newly created (as in the case with warrants or convertible debt). Options on common stock would in this case entail double counting of voting rights. In the case of warrants or convertibles, there is not such double counting, as the voting rights will be created at the exercise time when a new share comes into being. Analysis of the notification sheets reveals that the confusion has gradually disappeared and that the disclosure has focused more on potential voting rights related to new securities (warrants and convertibles). The percentage of ownership of the major shareholders is often an underestimation of the real corporate power these shareholders can exercise. The board, nominated by the major shareholders, could interpret a takeover threat as 'grave and imminent danger' which would allow them to repurchase shares. Furthermore, the board can allow share warrants to be exercised or sold to friendly shareholders for a maximum of 10% of equity capital in order to dilute shareholdings of a potential raider. This authority, for a maximum but renewable period of 5 years, has to be granted specifically to the board by the annual general meeting. Autocontrol mechanisms can also be installed whereby the company's shares are held by a subsidiary. However, a subsidiary's stake in the mother company is restricted to 10%. 22 The mandatory bid rule which has existed since 1965 on a self-regulatory basis has been incorporated into the amendments of law of 1991. The rule requires the acquirer of shares, in as far as control has changed at a price higher than the market price, to bid for all remaining shares and the bid price should be set at a premium above the highest market price over the last 12 months. This way, equal treatment of shareholders is ensured since all shareholders are offered the benefit of the control premium. Furthermore, the propensity to trade large blocks, resulting in companies taken over against their will, is diminished. 23 There are additional conditions for changes in the rights of different classes of shareholders. The board of directors needs to document the reasons for the changes extensively and has to send that report to all shareholders before the annual meeting. On the annual meeting, the proposal is only valid if 50% of the total outstanding voting rights are present and 75% of each category of shareholders votes in favour (Company Law, article 71). 24 Law of 18 June 1991, article 191. This law reduced the threshold from 20% to 1%. 25 At the annual general meeting, the directors are 'discharged' from liabilities that may arise in the future if shareholders present at the annual meeting judge, with information from the external auditors and data in the annual report, that the directors fulfilled their tasks adequately during the fiscal year. 26 Note that the minority claim (Company Law articles 66 bis paragraph 2, article 132 bis and article 158 bis) is for the benefit of the company and not for the benefit of the minority shareholder directly, although the minority shareholders, like all shareholders, might benefit. Consequently, this procedure to appoint experts cannot be used following conflicts between shareholders, but only if the company's economic position and its long term survival is endangered. Case law is rare, but the appointment of experts was justified in these cases: the stocks were overvalued, a company was badly managed and had negative earnings (Lievens 1994) . In addition to lowering the threshold level for the minority claim, the rules of conflicts of interest have been tightened : personal liability cannot be excluded if directors take undue advantage of their position to the detriment of the company (Wymeersch 1994a). An individual liability claim can only be initiated if the shareholder can prove that he has experienced personal damage. 27 Before 1991, no shareholder could participate in the voting at the annual meeting for more than 20 percent of the voting rights associated with the total shares outstanding or for more than 40 percent of the voting rights associated with shares represented at the annual meeting. The restriction limiting the exercise of voting rights most had priority. 28 In section 4, we use the following definition: control exerted by an ultimate shareholder on a sequence of intermediate companies and, ultimately, on the sample company exists if (i) there is a series of uninterrupted majority shareholdings on every ownership tier throughout the pyramid or (ii) if there is a large shareholding of at least 25 % on every ownership level in the absence of other shareholders with stakes of blocking minority size or larger. This criterion is used in the tables to calculate group blocks and identify the ultimate shareholder. 29 The main reason for the reduction of listed companies is the delisting of firms in coal mining and steel production either involved in a long liquidation process or existing as corporate shells. 30 The database of the National Bank also comprises data on large shareholdings as reported in the annual reports. However, the data on the Notifications of Ownership Changes are more detailed, often present organization charts of pyramidal ownership structures and give all the ownership changes that took place during the fiscal year rather than the ownership structure at the end of the fiscal year. 31 These five companies are : Delhaize Le Lion, HSPL, Koramic Building Products, SCF and Solvac. In some companies, like Delhaize and Solvac, a family owns a substantial share stake, but this shareholding is held by several members of the family who each hold less than 5% and consequently are not obliged to officially disclose their holding. 32 The detailed frequency distribution is reported in Becht and Chapelle (1997) . 33 Given that group blocks mostly coincide with voting blocks, we focus in this section on voting blocks. 34 The percentile plot of Figure 5 details the histogram data. 35 There was no shareholding of at least 25% of 17 sample companies (or 9% of the sample in 1989).
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36 To determine the ultimate controlling shareholder, we continued moving up in the shareholders' pyramid when the intermediate share stakes were (i) at least 50% or (ii) at least 25% in the absence of other shareholder with a stake of more than 25% (in this last case the shareholder with more than 25% is likely to possess majority control of the voting rights exercised on the annual meeting). If company A (a widely held company) owns 50% in company B which owns 50% in company C, the ultimate levered control of company A in C is 25% (50% * 50%). 37 The columns with data on holding companies, families and industrial companies do not add up to the numbers in the all investors column since the total cumulative concentrated ownership of this column is the sum of 8 investor categories. Institutional investors, banks etc do not hold substantial stakes in the sample companies and are not show in this table. 38 Since 1967 (See Article 1 of Royal Decree nr. 64 of 10 November 1967), there is a registration requirement for Belgian holding companies with a portfolio value of over 0.5 billion BEF (£ 10 million). Company Law does not distinguish between different holding categories and in this paper the NACE classification of the National Bank and of the Bank Brussel Lambert is used. However, the group of holding companies is still rather heterogeneous and includes holdings which are purely financial (e.g. Sofina), a combination of financial and industrial (Generale Maatschappij van België / Société Générale de Belgique) or more like a conglomerate (Tractebel). 39 Law of 2 March 1993. The Royal Decree of 8 May 1990 had already allowed the credit institutions to purchase shares up to 5% of their own funds since 1990. 40 Most share stakes held by institutional investors are under 5% and are as such not included in the analysis. Data about investment funds should be interpreted with caution since some investment funds investing in Belgian shares are domiciled in Luxembourg but managed by subsidiaries of Belgian banks. The Luxembourg authorities do not differentiate according to nationality of the managers of the fund. Regarding institutional investor shareholdings, Van der Elst (1998) reports a aggregate percentage of 17.7% of the votes in listed companies, while Wymeersch (1994b) reports 22% for a sample of listed and non-listed firms.
Beleggingsfonds met veranderlijk kapitaal (Bevek)/ Société d'Investissement à Capital Variable (Sicav) (mutual fund with variable capital).
42 Until the end of 1990, the investors in investment funds could not be represented by the investment fund on annual general meetings of companies in which the investment fund held shares. In practice, this legal prohibition made it impossible that the voting rights of shares held by investment funds were exercised. The legislation intended to avoid that investment funds would become instruments of financial groups which could strengthen their control on quoted companies. However, the result of this legislation was not neutral since the position of controlling shareholders was even strengthened. The Law of 4 December 1990, article 112, abolished this prohibition and stated that the acts of incorporation can determine in which cases the investment fund is to exercise the voting rights. 43 Ownership tables with the relative importance of each of the foreign shareholder classes (holding companies, banks, institutional investors, insurance companies, industrial companies, families and the government) are available upon request. 44 Shareholders of almost all the member states of the European Union, Switzerland, U.S.A., Canada, Japan, Panama, Congo, Rwanda, Liberia and the Cayman Islands hold stakes of at least 5% in Belgian listed companies.
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Figure 1 : Direct Stakes By Rank of Stake for All Listed Companies in 1995
Note: For each of the 135 notified companies the stakes were ranked. For blocks of equal size (ties) the average rank was assigned. This was never the case for the largest stake. For each category the minimum, median, mean and maximum were computed for all stakes in the category. 
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Figure 3 : Voting Blocks By Rank of Block for All Listed Companies in 1995
Note: For each of the 135 notified companies the blocks were ranked. For blocks of equal size the same value the average rank was assigned. This was never the case for the largest stake. For each category the minimum, median, mean and maximum were computed for all stakes in the category. No limit for active partners.
Not allowed No
Mixed firms
Société Privée à responsabilité Limitée -Vennootschap met Beperkte Aansprakelijkheid (SPRL/BVBA) Yes Restricted to agreed partners or submitted to the agreement of half of the partners having ¾ of the capital.
Notified in the firm's register. (12 + 4) , is the most striking example of the presence of French shareholders on the Brussels Stock Exchange. Paribas is another significant example. Soges is a special case since it is an investment fund. Soges belongs to the GBL group but it acts independently for its investments. This type of shareholder holds relatively small stakes (no more than 5%) and it is not an active shareholder. Besides holding companies, Belgian family groups are important: Boël, Janssen, Van der Mersch own large family holdings which often hold controlling blocks in several listed firms. Source : Own calculations based on information from the BDPart database of the Brussels Stock Exchange, ownership notifications of the documentation centre of the Brussels Stock Exchange and annual reports. Notes : This table presents the ultimate ownership level, defined as the highest level of ownership in an uninterrupted control chain (direct shareholdings are level 1). Ultimate control is control based on (i) a majority control (minimal 50% of the voting rights) on every ownership tier of the ownership pyramid or (ii) shareholdings of at least 25% on every tier in the absence of other shareholders holding stakes of 25% or more. A chain of fully owned subsidiaries are considered as one single shareholder. The direct largest shareholding is the average direct largest share stake of at least 25%. The ultimate levered shareholding is calculated by multiplying the share stakes of subsequent ownership tiers. The control leverage factor is the ratio of the direct shareholding divided by the ultimate levered shareholding. For instance, company A, whose shares are widely held, owns 40% of company B which, in turn, owns 40% of company C. The ultimate shareholder level is 2, the direct largest shareholding (of B in C) is 40%, the ultimate shareholding is 16% (40% x 40%), and the leverage factor is 2.5 (40/16). There was no direct shareholding of at least 25% in 17 sample companies, which were not included in this The non-listed holdings are used to bring in the capital of "friends" through share blocks. The listed companies are used to collect funds from capital markets. There are several instances when legal devices (such as dual class shares with multiple voting rights) are used to leverage voting power relative to cashflow rights, even at the level of the individual pyramid companies.
The two control chains meet in a Dutch holding company (Parjointco N.V.) , in which each partner holds 50% of the capital and voting rights. Parjointco controls the Swiss Pargesa Holding S.A. that is listed on the Swiss Stock Exchange. Pargesa is the point of entry to the group's portfolio. Portfolio companies fall into two groups (see Figure 6 ):
• Controlled companies (e.g. Petrofina)
• Friendly minority blocks with "friends", often involving distant cross-shareholdings with companies higher up in the pyramid, particularly on the Benelux side (e.g. Suez, Paribas, AXA-UAP)
The Desmarais control chain, the Frére control chain and the Pargesa portfolio can be cut in three subcascades:
The Canadian Chain
The Canadian pillar of the pyramid is controlled by Mr. Paul Desmarais. It consists of 5 companies : Gelco Enterprises, Pansolo Holding Inc., 3439496 Canada Inc., Power Corporation of Canada and Power Financial Corporation.
Gelco Enterprises, Pansolo Holding Inc. and 3439496 Canada Inc. are directly controlled by Mr. Desmarais (see Figure 7) . The exact ownership structure is not disclosed (source : Management Circular of the Power Corporation of Canada, circulated prior to the meeting of May 15 1998 with data for April 7 1998).
On April 7 1998, Mr. Desmarais controlled 64.9% of the votes of Power Corporation of Canada and 30.5% of its capital. The ultimate ownership stake of Mr. Desmarais can not be computed at this level because the leverage achieved through the three holding companies cannot be traced. "Beneficial ownership" in Canadian proxy statements refers to voting rights, not cash-flow rights. The leverage at the level of Power Corporation of Canada is achieved through a dual class capitalisation and multiple voting rights. Power Corporation has issued three types of shares : Non-participating with 0 votes, participating preferred shares with 10 votes and subordinate voting with 1 vote. Mr. Desmarais controlled 99.5% of the votes attached to the preferred shares and 21.8% of the subordinate shares.
Mr. Paul Desmarais receives $250,000 per year as the Chairman. All other directors received $15,000 (the chairman of the audit and compensation committee received and additional $10,000 and all director receive a bonus of $1,000 for each meeting they attend). Mr. Desmarais has been the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the company since 1968. Mr. André Desmarais and Mr. Paul Desmarais Jr. are the two Co-Chief executives. They received a salary of $700,000 plus $1,000,000 in bonus respectively in 1998 (source : Management Circular of the Power Corporation of Canada, circulated prior to the meeting of May 15 1998 with data for April 7 1998). 
The Benelux Pillar
The Frére Group consists of a chained series of holding companies. It is headed by the Frére-Bourgeois Group which is said to include a Dutch holding company registered in Rotterdam and a Dutch trust company. The capital is owned to 100% by Baron Albert Frére and his family (see Figure 8 ).
The first holding company (Erbe Group) provides a link with the French Paribas banking group. Pargesa, the Swiss investment holding company controlled by Parjointco, holds a 1.9% stake in Paribas, which provides for some double gearing.
The second holding company brings in capital from AXA-UAP, the Suez Group (via its Belgian holding company, Generale Maatschappij van België/Societé General de Belgique) and Electrafina, a Parjointco/Pargesa controlled company. Pargesa holds a 0.7% stake in AXA. Parjointco/Pargesa/GBL and AXA jointly control the Royal Belge. Hence, there is a considerable degree of double gearing at the second level of the control chain.
The third level of the chain collects funds from shareholders through the Brussels market. The Nationale Portefeulle Maatschappij (NPM) or Compagnie Nationale à Portefeuille (CNP) is the main investment vehicle of Baron Frère. It is at this level that we learn most about the European activities of the Frére-Desmarais group.
The fourth level is a Dutch holding company that is controlled by the family holding (51% of the votes) but majority owned by the listed company (89.5% of the cash-flow rights).
Finally, the Dutch holding company owns 50% of the Parjointco holding, the joint investment vehicle of the Frére-Desmarais group. At this level the Frére-Bourgeois cash-flow stake in Parjointco is, not taking into account the double gearing, 0.55x0.57x0.54x0.9 = 0.15 + 0.105 = 25.5%.
The Pargesa and NPM/CNP Portfolios
The portfolio of the group is not held directly by the Dutch Parjointco holding, but by the Swiss Pargesa holding (see Figures 9 and 10) . Pargesa is listed on the Swiss Stock Exchange and brings in additional funds from the market and, again, from the French Paribas group. The voting power of Parjointco and Paribas is leveraged through a dual class share capitalization. 
